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Hail? No! There's an App for That:
Georgia Courts Signal Favor for
Innovation Over Monopolies as
Taxis Battle Against Rideshares for
Market Dominance *
I. INTRODUCTION
Atlanta Metro Leasing, Inc. v. City of Atlanta1 was a battle in the
making between traditional taxis2 and novel rideshares3 since the latter
emerged in Atlanta's vehicle-for-hire marketplace.4 As a major player in
Atlanta's traditional taxi industry, Atlanta Metro Leasing, Inc. (Atlanta
Metro) went toe-to-toe with the City of Atlanta (City) for refusing to
enforce its ordinances against rideshare companies, such as Uber and
Lyft.5 Atlanta Metro contended the City’s failure to enforce its ordinances
eroded Atlanta Metro’s previously enjoyed exclusivity in the
vehicle-for-hire industry, and therefore, diminished the value of taxi

* To Professor Anne Johnson, thank you for being a source of wisdom and guidance. To
Morgan and Clayton Kendrick, the world's best mentors, thank you for blessing me with
your friendship. To my family, thank you for cheering me on and helping me abide. I do not
know where this journey will lead, but with you all by my side, I know it will be an
adventure! I love you guys.
1 353 Ga. App. 785, 839 S.E.2d 278 (2020).
2 O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(63.1) (2020); Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance § 22-201 (2020) (defining "taxi"
as a licensed vehicle for hire that carries a small, limited number of passengers on
personalized trips for a fee).
3 Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance § 22-201 (2020) (defining rideshare company as an entity that
uses a digital network to connect passengers to drivers for prearranged transportation for
hire).
4 Atlanta Metro, 353 Ga. App. at 787, 839 S.E.2d at 282–83.
5 Id. at 786–87, 791–92, 839 S.E. 2d at 282–83, 285–86; Atlanta, Ga., Code § 162-56(a)
(2020) (requiring taxis operating in the City of Atlanta to possess a medallion and Cityissued permit).
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medallions.6 Looming in the background, the advent of rideshares
prompted a nationwide rash of similar, but unsuccessful, lawsuits.7 In
addition to this unfavorable, yet persuasive precedent, Atlanta Metro
faced the challenge of overcoming the City's sovereign immunity
defense.8
In an attempt to overcome these hurdles, Atlanta Metro presented
the court with a matter of first impression: whether the City’s issuance
of taxi medallions created franchise agreements.9 The appeal of this
argument to Atlanta Metro was that a franchise agreement10 is a contract
protecting market exclusivity.11 And according to the Georgia
Legislature, a government entity cannot hide behind sovereign immunity
when it has breached a contract.12 Ultimately, the court disagreed and
held that the issuance of medallions did not constitute a franchise
agreement.13 The court's response to these arguments reflects its
forward-thinking approach and receptive attitude to the advancement of
technological innovations.

6 Id. at 787–87, 839 S.E.2d at 282–83; Atlanta, Ga., Code § 162-56(a) (2020) (explaining
that medallions, also known as certificates of public convenience and necessity, or CPNCs,
are transferable permits required as a prerequisite to obtaining a business license to
operate a taxi).
7 Illinois Transp. Trade Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding bifurcated regulatory scheme was not an equal protection violation); Checker Cab
Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 306 F. Supp. 3d 710, 735–36 (E.D. Pa. 2018)
(finding unequal treatment was justified because taxis and rideshares were not similarly
situated); Desoto Cab Company, Inc. v. Picker, 228 F. Supp. 3d 950, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(finding city was allowed to delegate regulatory duties over taxis and rideshares to different
agencies because their business schemes were dissimilar); Boston Taxi Owners Ass'n, Inc.
v. City of Boston, 180 F. Supp. 3d 108, 117 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2016) (finding ownership of
medallions did not equate to ownership in vehicle-for-hire industry to justify a right to
market exclusivity).
8 Atlanta Metro, 353 Ga. App. at 787–89, 839 S.E.2d at 283–84 (citing McConnell v. Dept.
of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 19, 805 S.E.2d 79 (2017)); GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9 (e) (Sovereign
immunity protects governmental municipalities from legal action unless it is otherwise
waived.).
9 Atlanta Metro, 353 Ga. App. at 785, 839 S.E.2d at 281–82.
10 Franchise, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining franchise as a privilege
conferred by the government that allowed a specific business substantive rights to operate
in designated areas).
11 Atlanta Metro, 353 Ga. App. at 786–87, 790–91, 839 S.E.2d at 282–83, 285.
12 Id. at 790–91, 839 S.E.2d at 285 (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(c) ("The
state's defense of sovereign immunity is hereby waived as to any action ex contractu for the
breach of any written contract now existing or hereafter entered into by the state or its
departments or agencies.")).
13 Id. at 800, 839 S.E.2d at 291.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The City has long required that taxis, a type of vehicle for hire, have
a medallion and a City-issued license to operate.14 After the City capped
the number of authorized medallions, the medallions themselves became
lucrative investments in what was considered a closed, exclusive
market.15 This medallion cap also fostered an understanding among
medallion owners "that the city would take reasonable measures to
enforce the [taxi] ordinance[s] such that unlicensed taxicab businesses in
the City would be curtailed and . . . [medallion] values would be protected
from diminution arising out of unlawful competition."16
Fast forward to 2012, the City saw the emergence of rideshare
companies, namely Uber and Lyft, operating as rivals to traditional
taxis.17 The City initially responded by ticketing rideshare drivers as
unlicensed taxis but suspended these efforts entirely in 2014.18 The City's
deferential treatment of rideshares has had dire consequences on
medallion values.19 In 2014, a single medallion in Atlanta was valued at
$80,000.20 By 2017, the estimated value was less than $10,000.21 This is
similar to plummeting values in other cities across the nation due to the
advent of rideshares. For example, the average cost of a medallion in New
York City fell from $1.16 million down to $164,518 between March 2014
to November 2019.22
Atlanta Metro filed suit against the City in the Fulton County
Superior Court for breach of franchise agreements allegedly created
when the City issued taxi medallions.23 Atlanta Metro claimed that taxis
were "urban transportation companies," and therefore, met the statutory
classification requirements of section 36-34-2(7)(A) of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated,24 under which the City was authorized to grant

14 Id. at 786, 839 S.E.2d at 282 (referring to code requiring taxis to possess medallions
instituted in 1977).
15 Id. (rising in value from $100 in 1977 to approximately $80,000 in 2014).
16 Id. at 786–87, 839 S.E.2d at 282.
17 Id. at 787, 839 S.E.2d at 282–83.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 787, 839 S.E. 2d at 283.
20 Id. at 786, 839 S.E.2d at 282.
21 Matt Kempner, Atlanta Cabbies Want Compensation Over Uber Rules, Atlanta
Journal Constitution (May 16, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/business/atlanta-cabbies-wantcompensation-over-uber-rules/TJecODvVIzNRviDtS9DgMN/.
22 New York City Council, Report of the Taxi Medallion Task Force (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://council.nyc.gov/data/taxis.
23 Atlanta Metro, 353 Ga. App. at 785–87, 839 S.E.2d at 281–83.
24 O.C.G.A. § 36-34-2(7)(A) (2020).
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franchises.25 Furthermore, Atlanta Metro asserted that, in addition to
vesting property rights, medallion ownership guaranteed market
exclusivity, and by failing to enforce taxi regulations equally against
rideshares, the City permitted illegal competition to damage medallion
values.26 The lawsuit spanned from 2014, when the City stopped issuing
citations to rideshares operating without medallions, until 2015 when
the Georgia General Assembly enacted legislation governing
rideshares.27 In response, the City filed a motion to dismiss. The trial
court granted the City's motion but gave no basis for its ruling.28
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling.29 The court of appeals rejected the assertion that taxis were urban
transportation companies.30 Therefore, since taxis did not fall into one of
the statutorily required classifications necessary for franchise formation,
the court held no franchise agreement or promise of market exclusivity
was created when the medallions were issued.31
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Local and State Legislative History
The Atlanta Code of Ordinances (Code)32 has given the City the power
to regulate taxis as vehicles for hire, since 1977.33 Per the Code, taxis
must be licensed by the City to operate in Atlanta.34 However, the City

Atlanta Metro, 353 Ga. App. at 793, 839 S.E.2d at 286–87.
Id. at 786–87, 791–92, 839 S.E.2d at 282–83, 285–86.
27 Id. at 787, 839 S.E.2d at 282–83 (referencing O.C.G.A. § 40-1-191 enacted July 1, 2015
and preempted the entire field of regulation over vehicles-for-hire, including taxis and
rideshares, throughout the state).
28 Id. at 787, 839 S.E.2d at 283.
29 Id. at 785, 839 S.E.2d at 281.
30 Id. at 794, 839 S.E.2d at 287.
31 Id. at 792–95, 798, 839 S.E.2d at 286–87, 289.
32 Atlanta, Ga., Code § 1-102 (2020).
33 Atlanta, Ga., Code § 1-102(c)(36) (2020) (citing "The city shall have all powers now
vested in the city and now or hereafter granted to municipal corporations by the laws of
Georgia and shall have the power . . . [t]o regulate and license vehicles operated for hire in
the city; to limit the number of such vehicles; to require the operators thereof to be licensed;
to require public liability insurance on such vehicles in amounts prescribed by
ordinance . . . .").
34 Atlanta, Ga., Code § 162-56(a) (2020) (citing "No vehicle for hire shall be operated on
the highways of the city . . . until the company with which it is affiliated has obtained a
business license from the city.").
25
26
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also exercised its authority under O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(a)35 and stipulated
that, as a prerequisite to obtaining a license, taxi operators must first
possess a limited, and therefore, hard-to-come-by taxi medallion.36 The
state of Georgia and the City both recognize that these medallions have
inherent property interests.37 Per O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(b),38 medallions
are fully transferrable by way of "purchase, gift, bequest, or
acquisition . . . ."39 Georgia Code section 36-60-25(b) also permits that
medallions can serve as collateral for loans, granting lenders property
rights as well.40 Section 162-62 of the Atlanta City Ordinance,41 which
governs medallions in the City, echoes the language of the statute.42
In response to the growing popularity of rideshares and varying
degrees of regulation in each municipality, the Georgia General
Assembly passed House Bill 225.43 Codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-1-191,44 this
statute preempted the entire field of regulation over vehicles for hire,
providing uniform administration of taxis and rideshares throughout the
state.45 Though O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(c)46 was also amended to prohibit
new taxi medallion regulations, any preexisting mandates, like those in
the City, remained enforceable.47
B. Taxis and Rideshares: Equal Protection and Market Exclusivity
1. Bifurcated Schemes and Unequal Treatment
When courts in other jurisdictions considered whether regulatory
schemes that held taxis and rideshares to different standards violated
35 O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(a) (2020) (citing "Each . . . municipal corporation may require the
owner or operator of a taxicab to obtain a certificate of public necessity and convenience or
medallion in order to operate . . . .").
36 Atlanta, Ga., Code § 162-61(a) (2020) (citing "The maximum number of taxicab
CPNC's outstanding shall be 1,600 . . . established in 1995"); Atlanta Metro, 353 Ga. App.
at 786, 839 S.E.2d at 282 (explaining the cost of a medallion increased from $100 in 1977
to $80,000 in 2014); Atlanta, Ga., Code § 162-56(a) (2020) (citing "No vehicle for hire shall
be operated . . . until its owner . . . has . . . a valid certificate of public necessity and
convenience . . . .").
37 O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(b) (2020); Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance § 162-62(a), (d), (e) (2020).
38 O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(b).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance § 162-62(a), (d), (e) (1977).
42 Id.
43 Ga. H.R. Bill 225, 2015 Ga. Laws (codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-1-191 (2020)).
44 O.C.G.A. § 40-1-191 (2020).
45 Id.
46 O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(c) (2020).
47 Id.
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equal protection rights, they answered in the negative.48 Bifurcated laws
that resulted in unequal treatment were constitutional if there was any
rational basis for the distinctive classifications.49
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit focused
on the differences between taxis and popular rideshare company, Uber,
in the 2016 case, Illinois Transportation Trade Association v. City of
Chicago.50 Striking down claims of equal protection violations, the court
held that the respective modes of operation were sufficiently dissimilar
which justified Chicago's separate regulatory structures.51 Notably, there
was a marked difference in the process by which passengers engaged
taxis and rideshares.52 Taxis were hired by being hailed on the street,
called through a dispatch service, or summoned at a taxi stand.53 Ubers,
meanwhile, could not be hailed in a point-of-sale fashion.54 Ubers were
hired by passengers who registered for an online account prior to
summoning the rideshare.55 The court held that, in contrast to hailing a
taxi, the process by which passengers requested Ubers created a
contractual relationship between the parties.56
Additionally, the court listed several convenience and safety
advantages of Uber over taxis.57 Uber stored passenger payment
information, provided estimated arrival times, and allowed patrons to
hail a ride from anywhere (as opposed to traditional taxi street hails).58
Moreover, Uber featured safety controls that allowed passengers to view
driver identification and ratings before the rider entered the vehicle.59
Likewise, passengers were encouraged to leave ratings after each trip as
this enticed safer driving practices.60 Furthermore, because Uber hired
part-time drivers, the cars presumably were driven less miles and had
less wear and tear.61 Regarding taxis, the court noted that some
48 Desoto Cab, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 962; Illinois Transp., 839 F.3d at 598; Checker Cab,
306 F. Supp. 3d at 736.
49 Checker Cab, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 738–39 (citing FCC v. Beach Communications, 508
U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993)).
50 839 F.3d at 595.
51 Id. at 598.
52 Id. at 595–96.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 598.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 596.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 598.
60 Id. at 596.
61 Id. at 598.
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passengers still preferred them because they were hailed quickly and
were immediately available.62 Also, taxi fares were fixed by the city and
predictable.63 However, given that the nature of street hails made
passengers more vulnerable, the city was justified when it enacted more
stringent oversight of taxis.64 Holding that rideshares and taxis were
distinct services, the court reasoned that consumers likely agreed,
because if not, rideshares could not have been established.65
Similar to Illinois Transportation, in Checker Cab Philadelphia v.
Philadelphia Parking Authority,66 a 2018 case from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court also
considered the merits of alleged equal protection violations.67 The court
found the claim lacking because taxi and rideshare companies were not
similarly situated, and therefore, unequal treatment was justified.68
Beginning in October 2014, the Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA)
enforced taxi ordinances against illegal rideshares.69 However, in 2016,
the PPA and Uber reached a settlement, and the PPA ceased all impound
and enforcement actions against rideshares.70 This agreement
constituted an acquiescence of rideshares' growing popularity in
Philadelphia.71
The court ruled that the legal status of taxis and rideshares was
substantially different.72 The court found it "significant that the
Pennsylvania legislature enacted new laws specifically"73 for rideshares,
rather than adapting existing taxi regulations to encompass them.74 The
court interpreted these new laws as a sign that the legislature considered
rideshares distinguishable enough from taxis to warrant separate
treatment.75
Similarly, due to the differences between taxis and rideshares, the
court in Desoto Cab Company, Inc. v. Picker,76 a 2017 case from the
Id. at 597.
Id.
64 Id. at 598.
65 Id. at 598–99.
66 306 F. Supp. 3d 710 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
67 Id. at 731.
68 Id. at 735, 738–39.
69 Id. at 725.
70 Id. at 725–26.
71 Id. at 730.
72 Id. at 735.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 735–36.
76 228 F. Supp. 3d at 950 (aff'd, 714 F. App'x. 783 (9th Cir. 2018)).
62
63
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United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
found San Francisco's bifurcated regulatory scheme constitutional.77
When rideshares first emerged in the city, the same agency that oversaw
taxis, the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA),
also oversaw rideshares.78 Not long after they were established,
rideshare oversight was transferred to the less strict Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC).79 Oversight of taxis, on the other hand, remained
with the more stringent SFMTA.80 San Francisco premised the change
on California's recognition that revolutionary rideshares did not meet the
conventional definition of taxis.81 The court contemplated whether
rideshares were "de facto taxis" which required regulation by the same
agency as taxis.82 The CPUC classified rideshares as "prearranged"
charter-party carriers, which the court identified as the main
differentiating factor.83
The CPUC required rideshare drivers to "have a completed waybill in
his or her possession at all times during the trip."84 This waybill was
proof that the driver prearranged details of the passenger, route, and
charges prior to initiating the trip.85 By contrast, taxi drivers exchanged
no information until the passenger entered the vehicle.86 Further, the
court found it impractical for passengers to negotiate and compare rates
with taxis in a street hail situation.87 Therefore, since taxis were not
"prearranged" they were not charter-party carriers.88 Like Illinois
Transportation and Checker Cab, the court's ruling rested on the bedrock
that taxis and rideshares were not sufficiently similar, and therefore,
unequal regulation was justified.89
2. Medallions and Market Exclusivity
In the 2016 case of Boston Taxi Owners Ass’n Inc. v. City of Boston,90
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled
Id. at 962.
Id. at 954.
79 Id. at 954–55.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 954.
82 Id. at 952.
83 Id. at 954–55, 960.
84 Id. at 954.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 954–55.
87 Id. at 961.
88 Id. at 953.
89 Id. at 960; Illinois Transp., 839 F.3d at 598; Checker Cab, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 738–39.
90 180 F. Supp. 3d at 108.
77
78
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that Boston's nonenforcement of taxi regulations against rideshares did
not violate the plaintiff's rights.91 Further, the court also proffered that
taxi companies had no right to marketplace exclusivity in the
vehicles-for-hire industry.92
The City of Boston required that all taxi operators be licensed with
medallions and abide by the taxi enforcement codes under Rule 403.93
Prior to the advent of rideshares, based on the limited number of
medallions issued by the city and the own-to-operate requirement,
medallion owners enjoyed isolated market exclusivity.94 However,
beginning in 2012, rideshares appeared in Boston and operated without
medallions.95 The City of Boston took the stance that it would not enforce
the taxi-related regulations against rideshares.96
In evaluating whether the different regulatory structures improperly
harmed medallion owners, the court found that market exclusivity was
not a right vested by medallion ownership.97 The court held that each
owner only enjoyed exclusivity to his own medallion.98 Furthermore,
owning a medallion was not equivalent to owning an interest in the
vehicle-for-hire market.99 Thus, owning a medallion did not confer the
right to exclude others.100 The exclusivity previously enjoyed before the
introduction of rideshares was a product solely of the regulatory scheme
and not a right of exclusivity by virtue of medallion ownership.101
Lastly, in 2017, the Georgia Supreme Court applied these same
principals barring exclusivity in Abramyan v. State, 102 and held that taxi
companies were not entitled to an "unalterable monopoly." 103 In 2015,
following the introduction of rideshares to the vehicle-for-hire market,
Georgia enacted O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(a).104 This provision prohibited
municipalities from requiring taxi operators to obtain a medallion unless
Id. at 117.
Id.
93 Id. at 113 (referencing Boston Police Department "Rule 403" as a comprehensive set
of taxi regulations which requires all taxi operators to possess a medallion, maintain
properly functioning vehicles, and sets forth rules for engaging customers).
94 Id. at 113, 117.
95 Id. at 114.
96 Id. at 113–14.
97 Id. at 117.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 301 Ga. 308, 800 S.E.2d 366 (2017).
103 Id. at 309, 800 S.E.2d at 368.
104 Id. at 308–09, 800 S.E.2d at 368.
91
92
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the City had previously required one before the law was passed.105
Existing taxi operators in Atlanta, who were grandfathered in to the
medallion prerequisite, asserted that the new legislation infringed on
their exclusive rights as medallion owners.106 The court pointed out that
because the City had a preexisting medallion requirement, new entrants
into the City's taxi market would also be required to purchase a
medallion.107 The court found no basis to conclude, however, that mere
ownership of a medallion equated to a rightful claim to exclusivity.108
C. Franchise Agreements
A franchise is a privilege conferred by the government that allows a
specific business substantive rights to operate in designated areas.109 As
such, a franchise constitutes a contract with property privileges.110
Because franchise agreements result in a degree of market exclusivity,
Georgia took a narrow approach as to which types of industries could be
granted a franchise.111 Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 36-34-2(7)(A) delegates
municipalities the power to grant franchises "for the use and occupancy
of the streets"112 only to public utilities and services, as well as urban
transportation companies.113
Georgia Code section 36-34-2(7)(A) enumerates several commonly
accepted public utilities and services.114 Included in the statute are
power, gas, steam-heat, telephone, and water companies.115 These
frequently approved utility providers are not, however, automatically
granted a franchise.116 For example, in City of Macon v. Alltel Commc’ns,
Inc.,117 the city alleged a franchise agreement existed with a local
telephone provider in a bid to charge higher fees.118 The Georgia Supreme

Id.
Id. at 309, 800 S.E.2d at 368.
107 Id. at 310, 800 S.E.2d at 369.
108 Id. at 311, 800 S.E.2d at 369.
109 Franchise, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
110 Macon Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Snow Props., Inc., 218 Ga. 262, 265, 127 S.E.2d 598,
601 (1962).
111 O.C.G.A. § 36-34-2(7)(A) (2020).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 City of Macon v. Alltel Commc'ns, Inc., 277 Ga. 823, 830, 596 S.E.2d 589, 595 (2004).
117 Id. at 823, 596 S.E.2d at 589.
118 Id. at 824–26, 830, 596 S.E.2d at 591–92, 595.
105
106
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Court held that while telephone companies could be franchised if they
chose, no party could unilaterally create a contract.119
1. Franchise-Eligible Urban Transportation Companies
Though O.C.G.A. § 36-34-2(7)(A) does not define "urban
transportation company," the inspiration for the term was likely derived
from McCutcheon v. Wozencraft,120 a case decided in 1923 by the Texas
Supreme Court.121 In McCutcheon, the city of Dallas denied a petition to
grant a motor bus company a franchise.122 After the court analyzed other
types of urban transportation throughout the evolution of the industry,
the court held motor buses were, in fact, franchises.123
Cities like Dallas had a tendency to restrict the grant of franchises to
protect against greed from the inevitable monopolies that resulted.124
However, on the flip side, companies that provided public services to the
masses invested a large amount of capital to establish infrastructures.125
These companies required the city guarantee some right of permanency,
beyond a mere operational license, to justify their investments.126 In
congealing the definition of which businesses qualified for these
protections, the court highlighted that true franchises generally required
the use of "definite or designated portions of . . . public thoroughfares."127
Uncontested franchises such as public utilities, street cars, and railways
required dedicated land for tracks, pipes, and poles.128 The court
paralleled this with the fixed routes on which motor busses operated and
concluded that, just like the uncontested franchises, busses also used
designated portions of city streets.129
Turning an eye toward public interest in transportation innovations,
the court considered the evolutionary aspects of the industry.130 In New
York, double-decker busses, held to be a franchise, took the place of
horse-drawn stage lines.131 These busses, vital to public interest,

Id. at 830, 596 S.E.2d at 595.
255 S.W. 716 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, rev’d).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 718–19.
124 Id. at 718
125 Id. at 719.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 718–19.
128 Id. at 719.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
119
120
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operated in areas inaccessible to street cars.132 The court rightfully
predicted that street cars, a common mode of transportation at the time,
would be discarded as the industry progressed.133
In summation, the court held motor bus companies to be a
franchise-eligible form of urban transportation.134 This was premised on
the fact that busses provided the public with a comprehensive system of
mass transportation which operated on fixed routes and designated
thoroughfares.135 Lastly, the capital investment required to establish the
urban transportation network was significant and warranted some
degree of permanency from the city.136 Therefore, motor busses that
provided urban transportation were franchises.137
2. Prohibition on Exclusive Franchises
In 1962, the Georgia Supreme Court held, in Macon Ambulance
Service, Inc. v. Snow Properties,138 that unless the legislature conferred
an express power, municipalities were forbidden to grant exclusive
franchises.139 Doing so, the court reasoned, encouraged wrongful
monopolies and stifled competition.140 Though the use of streets could be
authorized, cities could not adopt ordinances that gave all work of one
trade exclusively to one provider.141
In Macon Ambulance, the court deemed the city's ordinance granting
an exclusive, five-year franchise to an ambulance provider void.142
Macon's city charter authorized the mayor and city council to establish
regulations, including oversight of ambulances for hire that affected the
security, welfare, and health of the city.143 Acting on that authority, the
city entered a franchise agreement with Macon Ambulance Service to
provide transportation of wounded or ill charity patients to and from the
hospital within Macon's city limits.144 Nonetheless, the supreme court
ruled that the public service provided was insufficient to overcome the

Id.
Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 218 Ga. at 262, 127 S.E.2d at 598.
139 Id. at 265–67, 127 S.E.2d at 601–02.
140 Id. at 266, 127 S.E.2d at 601.
141 Id. at 265–66, 127 S.E.2d at 601.
142 Id. at 268, 127 S.E.2d at 602.
143 Id. at 265, 127 S.E.2d at 600.
144 Id.
132
133
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unauthorized monopoly created by the exclusive franchise ordinance.145
The court explained that the city's charter granted "[t]he power to
prohibit any ambulance for hire from using the streets of Macon [but the
charter did] not carry with it the power to grant an exclusive right to one
party engaged in a private business to so use its streets for such
purpose."146
The Georgia Court of Appeals followed this precedent in the 1986 case
of Cable Holdings of Battlefield, Inc. v. Lookout Cable Services.147 In 1972,
several local government entities granted Cable Holdings, the county's
community antenna television service, an exclusive franchise to operate
in Walker County.148 The court reinforced the holding of Macon
Ambulance and held that the exclusivity features of the franchise
agreement were void and unenforceable because the local government
lacked the authority to grant them.149 The nature of the franchise
involved, a local community television station, was irrelevant to the
analysis, even though a natural monopoly existed in the market.150 The
court held that where natural monopolies existed, the marketplace would
make an exclusive determination.151
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
Judge Hodges, writing for the Georgia Court of Appeals, held that no
franchise agreement was breached with Atlanta Metro when the City
refused to enforce taxi regulations against rideshares because no
franchise agreement existed in the first place.152 Though a valid franchise
agreement could have conferred privileges of market exclusivity, the
court held the City was not statutorily authorized to grant such a
franchise under O.C.G.A. § 36-34-2(7)(A).153 Likewise, the court
discerned that even though O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(b) and Code § 162-62
recognize the property rights of medallions, the mere fact that a franchise
also creates property rights does not mean the two are symbiotic.154

Id. at 267–68, 127 S.E.2d at 602.
Id. at 266–67, 127 S.E.2d at 601.
147 178 Ga. App. 456, 457–58, 343 S.E.2d 737, 739–40 (1986).
148 Id. at 456, 343 S.E.2d at 738.
149 Id. at 456–59, 343 S.E.2d at 739–40.
150 Id. at 457, 343 S.E.2d at 739.
151 Id.
152 Atlanta Metro, 353 Ga. App. at 785, 839 S.E.2d at 281–82.
153 Id. at 792–94, 839 S.E.2d at 286–87.
154 Id. at 795–96, 839 S.E.2d at 287–88.
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A. Statutory Classifications of Permissible Franchisees
"The prevailing rule is that unless the power is expressly conferred
by the legislature, a municipal corporation can not grant . . . an exclusive
privilege or monopoly."155 Georgia Code section 36-34-2(7)(A) authorizes
the City to grant franchises to public utilities and services, as well as
urban transportation companies.156 Atlanta Metro conceded, as a matter
of statutory interpretation, that taxis were not public utilities or
services.157 Rather, it argued that taxis fell under the umbrella of "urban
transportation companies." 158
The court derived its definition of "urban transportation company"
from Texas's McCutcheon opinion, one of the rare cases that discussed
evolving forms of urban transportation.159 Using McCutcheon as a
framework, the Georgia Court of Appeals drew several distinctions
between taxis and urban transportation companies.160 The court
articulated that urban transportation companies used designated
thoroughfares, operated on fixed routes, offered mass-transit, and
required extensive capital to build and maintain an urban
infrastructure.161
Taxis, on the other hand, did not possess the trademark
characteristics of urban transportation companies.162 Rather than
operating on designated thoroughfares and fixed routes, taxis could drive
on any public street and followed whatever route the passenger
preferred.163 Additionally, rather than providing mass transit, taxis
transported individual passengers to unique destinations.164 Lastly,
unlike urban transportation companies, taxis did not require extensive
capital to build an infrastructure, justifying some degree of
permanency.165 Therefore, since taxis did not meet an O.C.G.A.
§ 36-34-2(7)(A) qualified classification for which the City was authorized

155 Id. at 792, 839 S.E.2d at 286 (quoting Macon Ambulance, 218 Ga. at 265, 127 S.E.2d
at 598).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 793, 839 S.E.2d at 286.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 793–94, 839 S.E.2d at 286–87.
160 Id. at 794, 839 S.E.2d at 287.
161 Id. at 793–94, 839 S.E.2d at 286–87.
162 Id. at 794, 839 S.E.2d at 287.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 793, 839 S.E.2d at 286.
165 Id.
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to grant a franchise, the court held there was no valid franchise
agreement between Atlanta Metro and the City of Atlanta.166
Next, the court studied Section 1-102(c) of the Atlanta City Ordinance
and held that, based on its language, the City did not grant a franchise
when it issued medallions.167 The ordinance authorizes the City to grant
franchises to public utilities and services.168 In addition to reiterating
that taxis were not, in fact, public utilities and services, the court
highlighted that the ordinance "empower[ed] the City to license and
regulate vehicles . . . for hire."169 The court found the term "license"
particularly noteworthy and held that the text of Section 1-102(c)
supported the conclusion that medallions were unequivocally not
franchises.170
Additionally, it is widely accepted that a franchise is a contract that
creates property rights, however, the court of appeals ruled that the
property rights vested in medallion ownership did not equate to a
franchise.171 Though medallions could be sold, transferred, bequeathed,
and pledged as collateral for loans, the court held this did not alter the
glaring fact that taxis were not public services or utilities.172 Therefore,
because O.C.G.A. § 36-34-2(7)(A) and Atlanta City Ordinance § 1-102
only authorized the City to grant franchises to public services or utilities,
the City did not have the power to grant franchises to taxis.173
B. Statutory Intent
The Georgia Court of Appeals looked at the apparent intent of
O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(a) and Section 162-56(a) of the Atlanta City
Ordinance and concluded that neither provision manifested an intent to
form a contract.174 Georgia Code section 36-60-25(a) uses permissible
language in stating that the City "may" require a taxi operator to obtain
a medallion.175 Likewise, the City ordinance states that no vehicle for hire
can be operated until its owner has obtained a medallion and business

Id. at 794, 796, 839 S.E.2d at 287–88.
Id. at 794–95, 839 S.E.2d at 287.
168 Id. at 794, 839 S.E.2d at 287.
169 Id. at 794–95, 839 S.E.2d at 287 (stating public utilities and services, for the purposes
of Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance § 1-102(c), provided a comprehensive system of benefits to the
City, not those that provided benefits on an individual basis and operated on fixed routes).
170 Id. at 795, 839 S.E.2d at 287.
171 Id. at 795–96, 839 S.E.2d at 287–88.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 794, 796, 839 S.E.2d at 287–88.
174 Id. at 797–98, 839 S.E.2d at 289.
175 Id. at 797, 839 S.E.2d at 289.
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license.176 Specifically, the ordinance states, "No such business license
shall be issued until the [medallion] and company permits have been
issued . . . ."177 The court focused on the words "business license" in
holding that the intent was to require a medallion before taxis became
licensed, rather than forming a franchise agreement when the medallion
was issued.178 Lastly, the court proffered that the intent behind these
provisions was to promote public safety and convenience.179 The purpose
was not, the court held, intended to create specific property rights in
franchise agreements with promises of perpetual exclusivity in the
vehicles-for-hire market.180 The court noted other jurisdictions had
performed a similar analysis in considering whether city regulations
created a binding contract in relation to medallion issuance and came to
the same result.181 The court concluded that the City's regulations did
not support an inference that medallion issuance obligated the City to
provide taxis with market exclusivity, by franchise or otherwise.182
C. Court's Conclusion
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and
held that, based on the terms in the relevant statutes and ordinances,
the City lacked statutory standing to enter into franchise agreements
with taxi companies.183 The inherent property rights of medallions was
insufficient to overcome the lack of required classification for statutory
authority to grant a franchise.184 Therefore, the City's sovereign
immunity barred Atlanta Metro's attempted recovery for diminished
medallion values due to the loss of market exclusivity and the City's
favorable treatment of rideshares.185 In so ruling, the Georgia Court of
Appeals joined the ranks of its sister states and struck down attempts by
Atlanta taxis to fight back against the invasion of rideshares in the
vehicle-for-hire market.186
Id. at 798, 839 S.E.2d at 289.
Id. (quoting Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance § 162-56(a)).
178 Id.
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180 Id. at 798–99, 839 S.E.2d at 290.
181 Id. at 799–800, 839 S.E.2d at 290.
182 Id. at 800, 839 S.E.2d at 290.
183 Id. at 796, 839 S.E.2d at 288.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 800, 839 S.E.2d at 290 (holding that because the City did not enter a franchise
agreement when it issued medallions, no contract was formed to breach, and therefore,
because there was no breached contract, the City's sovereign immunity barred Atlanta
Metro's claims).
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V. IMPLICATIONS
Atlanta Metro, as a case involving a matter of first impression,
represents Georgia's initiation into the global conversation regarding the
impacts emerging technologies have had on the transportation industry
and related legal constructs. These are revolutionary times and rapid
innovations are impacting a vast array of industries. Technologies that
seemed impossible only a few short years ago are the realities of the world
today. As society adopts these changes, existing industries, as well as the
law, must adapt accordingly. Atlanta Metro offers a glimpse into the
philosophy Georgia courts will likely implement in future cases involving
tensions between existing and emerging technologies.
Atlanta Metro illustrated what will become an even greater necessity
for Georgia attorneys—clever lawyering. Likely due to the almost
universal courtroom failures of taxi companies in other jurisdictions, the
attorneys proffered a new legal theory. Atlanta Metro attempted to
cement the City's feet into a franchise agreement and exploited a
previously ill-defined, but permissible, franchise classification: urban
transportation companies. If successful, the court could have held that
the City entered a valid franchise agreement that not only invalidated
the City's sovereign immunity defense, but also guaranteed freedom from
illegal competition (i.e. rideshares) when it issued taxi medallions.
Though the argument was unsuccessful, the court gave, at long last, a
definition to the statutory term "urban transportation company."
The case also illustrated how Georgia courts, legislature, and market
competitors might engage going forward. The court, in line with similar
holdings from foreign jurisdictions, took a utilitarian approach. The
legislature will not be accountable for diminished property values caused
by the passage of new laws intended for public good. Additionally, though
taxis sought equal regulatory treatment by blurring distinctions with
rideshares, the court suggested the market should decide the similarity
of services.
Furthermore, the court will not allow existing industries to preclude
new market entrants as this would stunt innovation to the public's
detriment. In the vehicle-for-hire industry, technological advances have
improved the safety and convenience for passengers, as well as increased
access to affordable transportation. Absent the court's willingness to
permit competition and innovation, instead of taxis and rideshares we
might have horses and buggies. Atlanta Metro highlights Georgia's
receptive and forward-thinking policies on the advancements of the
technological revolution.
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